Chameleon signatures are non-interactive signatures based on a hash-and-sign paradigm, and similar in efficiency to regular signatures. The distinguishing characteristic of chameleon signatures is that there are non-transferable, with only the designated recipient capable of asserting its validity. In this paper, we introduce a new ID-based chameleon hash function based on bilinear pairing and build the ID-based chameleon signature scheme. Compared with the conventional chameleon hashing functions, the owner of a public hash key in the ID-based chameleon hashing scheme does not necessarily need to retrieve the associated secret key. The scheme enjoys all the attributes in the normal chameleon signature and the added characteristics of ID-based cryptography based on bilinear pairing.
Introduction
The conventional digital signatures can be validated by any party, but this may be undesirable in many business and e-commerce situations. Previous work has dealt with the problem of bridging between the contradictory requirements of non-repudiation and controlled dissemination via the notion of undeniable signatures. The notion was introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen [1] and followed by many research works, e.g. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . The basic paradigm behind this type of signatures is that verification of signature requires the collaboration of signer, so that the latter can control to whom the singed document is being disclosed. The crucial requirement is non-transferable, i.e. a signature issued to a designated recipient cannot be validated by another party. To prevent leaking of information these protocols are based on zero-knowledge proofs and this add to the complexity of the schemes relative to regular digital signatures.
Chameleon signature schemes were introduced in [7] which is a much simple implementation of the notion of undeniable signatures. The main technical novelty of chameleon signatures is in departing from the zero-knowledge paradigm. Unlike undeniable signatures, which also provide non-repudiation and non-transferability, chameleon signatures are non-interactive protocols. More precisely, the signer can generate the chameleon signature without interacting with the designated recipient, and the latter will be able to verify the signature without interacting with the former. Similarly, if presented with a forged signature, the signer can deny its validity by revealing certain values. These values will the original signature and the forged one simultaneously, and the revocation can be universally verified. In other words, the forged-signature denial protocol is also non-interactive. Chameleon signatures are based on the well established hash-and-sign paradigm, where a chameleon hash function is used to compute the cryptographic message digest. A chameleon hash function is a trapdoor one-way hash function.
In this paper, we present a new ID-based chameleon signature scheme using a chameleon hash function from bilinear pairing. The scheme enjoys all the attributes of the chameleon signature and the advantages of ID-based cryptography from Bilinear pairing over the elliptic curve.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section briefly explains the bilinear pairing and the Decisional Hash Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DHBD) assumption. Section 3 gives a detailed description of our ID-based chameleon signature scheme. In section 4, a heuristic security analysis is presented. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Bilinear maps and the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Let and be two cyclic groups of order for some large prime .
is a cyclic additive group and is a cyclic multiplicative group. We assume that the discrete logarithm problems in both and are hard. Let be a pairing which satisfies the following conditions:
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We note that the Weil and Tate pairings associated with supersingular elliptic curves or abelian varieties can be modified to create such bilinear maps. We refer to [8, 9, 10, 11] for more details.
BDH Parameter Generator:
We say that a randomized algorithm be a BDH parameter generator if (1) takes a security parameter
in polynomial time in , and (3) outputs the description of two groups and the description of a bilinear map
Decisional Hash Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DHBDH) problem in 1 2 , , G G e < > :
Instance: for some and a one way hash function . 
ID-based Chameleon Hashing
Here we present an ID-based chameleon hashing scheme from bilinear pairing and based on DHBDH assumption. We assume that all system users are identifiable by a bit-string easily derivable from public knowledge about the individual. Formally, an ID-based chameleon hashing scheme is defined by a family of efficiently computable algorithms: Setup, Extract, Hash and Forge. Setup: A trusted party, Trusted Authorities (TA), works as follows: Setup 1: Run some BDH parameter generator on input a security parameter to generate two prime order groups and the description of a bilinear map described above. Choose an arbitrary generator Note indeed that 
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ID-based Chameleon Signature Schemes
Here we present in some detail the ID-based chameleon signature scheme. An ID-based chameleon signature is generated by digitally signing a chameleon hash value of message. The digital signature scheme used here is some regular digital signature scheme (such as RSA or DSS). We start by describing the setting for ID-based chameleon signatures. The setting defines the players and the agreement upon functions and keys. Players: Signer and recipient S R . In addition we shall refer to a judge who represents a party in charge of settling disputes between and J S R , and with whom is assumed to collaborate.
S

Functions:
The players agree on:
A digital signature scheme (e.g., RSA, DSS) which defines a set of public and private keys associated with the signer and the usual operations of signing, denoted by , and verification, denoted byVERI . SIGN FY A chameleon hashing function Hash which defines a set of public and private keys associated with the owner of the hash function. This function has been described in Section3.1.
Key:
The signer has a public and private signature keys which correspond to the agreed on signature scheme, denoted by and , respectively. 3. If wants to claim that the signature is invalid he will need to provide a collision in the chameleon hash function. Otherwise, simple confirms to the judge this fact.
S S
The following is the process that generates collision in the hash function. S Generate Collision:
